

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION NEA-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 EUR-08 PM-03 SP-02 NSC-05 NSCE-00

INR-07 CIAE-00 DODE-00 AF-04 ACDA-10 /060 W

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FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2203

INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

USINT BAGHDAD

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DOHA

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MANAMA

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

AMEMBASSY SANAA

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 KUWAIT 0671

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PINS, MASS, KU

SUBJECT: ADVISORY ROLES OF UK AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN DEFENSE/
SECURITY FIELD IN PERSIAN GULF STATES

REF: A. STATE 029563 B. STATE A-74 OF JAN 6 C. KUWAIT 0546

D. KUWAIT 0561 E. KUWAIT 0618 F. KUWAIT 0632

SUMMARY: A) EMBASSY KUWAIT IS NOT IMPRESSED BY THE INSPECTORS'
SUGGESTION THAT GULF COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY KUWAIT, CONTINUE
TO DEPEND ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON BRITISH AND OTHER TRADITIONAL
SUPPLIERS FOR ADVICE ON DEFENSE/SECURITY MATTERS. IT IS ASSUMED

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THESE RECOMMENDATIONS WERE MEANT PRIMARILY FOR COUNTRIES IN THE

LOWER GULF. WHILE MAXIMUM USE SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE MADE OF OTHER FOREIGN ADVISERS BY KUWAIT, THE MAJOR ROLE IN PROVIDING ADVICE, ASSISTANCE AND ARMS SHOULD, IN THE EMBASSY'S JUDGEMENT, BE PLAYED BY THE US. ESTABLISHMENT OF A SPECIAL JORDANIAN FORCE FOR KUWAIT OR THE UPPER GULF AT THIS TIME IS CONSIDERED NEITHER PRACTICAL NOR DESIRABLE; B) IF WE ARE NOT PREPARED AT THIS TIME TO MAKE A MAJOR COMMITMENT TO HELP KUWAIT IN ITS ARMS MODERNIZATION PROGRAM, WE SHOULD SO INFORM THE GOK AND RECOMMEND THAT IT UNDERTAKE A MORE MEASURED COURSE OF ARMS PROCUREMENT AND MORE GRADUAL MILITARY BUILDUP, WITH LIMITED US AND UK ASSISTANCE AND IN CLOSER CONSULTATION WITH ITS ARAB NEIGHBORS, INCLUDING IRAQ. END SUMMARY.

1. AS INDICATED IN THE INSPECTOR'S REPORT, THE GOK CURRENTLY IS DEPENDENT IN LARGE MEASURE ON UK ADVISERS IN DEFENSE/SECURITY FIELDS. WHILE THE NUMBER VARIES, THE COMPLEMENT OF THE BRITISH LIAISON GROUP NORMALLY IS IN THE RANGE INDICATED -- PRESENTLY 120 SECONDED OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN AND 20 CIVILIAN ADVISERS, THE LATTER SERVING MOSTLY IN MAINTENANCE AND LOGISTICS ACTIVITIES. ABOUT ONE-THIRD WORK WITH KUWAIT'S HUNTER/LIGHTING-EQUIPPED AIR FORCE AND THE REMAINDER WITH KUWAIT'S CENTURION-EQUIPPED ARMY. APPROXIMATELY 55 KAF PERSONNEL PRESENTLY ARE IN PAKISTANI TECHNICAL SCHOOLS. EGYPTIAN TEAMS OCCASIONALLY VISIT KUWAIT TO ADVISE ON AIR DEFENSE MATTERS. IN LARGE MEASURE, MAINTENANCE AND LOGISTICAL SERVICES ARE PERFORMED BY EXPATRIATE PERSONNEL, INCLUDING SOME JORDANIANS, UNDER KUWAITI SUPERVISION. UNDER PRESENT POLICIES, THE GOK REFUSES TO SEND THESE PERSONNEL ABROAD FOR TECHNICAL TRAINING. ABOUT ONE-THIRD OF KUWAIT'S ARMY IS COMPOSED OF IRAQI AND SAUDI TRIBESMEN. NO SUDANESE SERVE IN AN ADVISORY CAPACITY IN KUWAIT.

2. WITHIN RECENT MONTHS, THE GOK HAS MADE ABUNDANTLY CLEAR IT WOULD LIKE TO RELY A GREAT DEAL MORE ON THE UNITED STATES FOR MILITARY ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE. THIS SUBJECT IS DISCUSSED IN DETAIL IN REFTEL (E). OTHER EMBASSY REFTELS DESCRIBE KUWAIT'S CURRENT PROSPECTIVE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE PROBLEMS AND POLICIES AS THEY WILL AFFECT US INTERESTS. THE EMBASSY STRONGLY RECOMMENDS THAT, WITHIN CERTAIN CONSTRAINTS AND WITH CERTAIN CAVEATS, THE USG RESPOND AS FAVORABLY AS POSSIBLE TO KUWAITI DESIRES FOR ASSISTANCE IN THESE AREAS. A SMALL US MAAG

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STAFF IS UNDER CONSIDERATION. CURRENTLY 111 GOK MILITARY PERSONNEL ARE IN THE US FOR TRAINING. THIS NUMBER COULD INCREASE TO 300 BY THE END OF THE YEAR.

3. THE EMBASSY HAS NEVER QUESTIONED THE ADVISABILITY OR DESIRABILITY OF A CONTINUED AND INCREASED BRITISH PRESENCE IN KUWAIT. WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY URGED OUR UK COLLEAGUES TO COUNSEL GREATER BRITISH ASSISTANCE TO KUWAIT'S ARMED FORCES. DESPITE

COMMERCIAL CONSIDERATIONS, WE HAVE NOT DISCOURAGED KUWAITI PURCHASE OF THE BRITISH CHIEFTAIN TANK AND THE ASSIGNMENT OF SUFFICIENT UK PERSONNEL INTO THE GOK'S ARMED FORCES. (IF SOLD, THE UK CURRENTLY INTENDS TO AUGMENT ITS LIAISON GROUP IN KUWAIT BY FOUR OFFICERS AND TO SEND A YET UNDECIDED NUMBER OF GOK PERSONNEL TO THE UK FOR TRAINING).

4. SIMILARLY, WE HAVE NOT DISCOURAGED KUWAIT FROM SENDING ITS MILITARY PERSONNEL TO BRITISH AND PAKISTANI TECHNICAL SCHOOLS. THE GOK HAS EXPRESSED LITTLE INTEREST IN RECEIVING MILITARY ADVICE FROM JORDAN (DESPITE THE RESUMPTION OF FINANCIAL AID TO THAT COUNTRY WHICH COULD WELL MERIT GOJ TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR AND TRAINING OF GOK FORCES). INCREASED JORDANIAN ASSISTANCE IS DESIRABLE BUT PROBABLY WON'T BE SOLICITED.

5. THE MAJOR PROBLEM WE FIND WITH THE INSPECTORS' SUGGESTION THAT GULF COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY KUWAIT, CONTINUE TO DEPEND IN LARGE MEASURE ON BRITISH AND OTHER TRADITIONAL SUPPLIERS FOR ADVICE ON DEFENSE/SECURITY MATTERS IS THAT THIS IS NOT THE GOK'S DESIRE (IT CURRENTLY WANTS US WEAPONS SYSTEMS) NOR IS IT LIKELY TO RESULT IN THE KIND OF EFFECTIVE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT IN KUWAIT WHICH WE BELIEVE IS IN THE US INTEREST. FOR THE REASONS CITED IN REFTTEL (E), WE BELIEVE ONLY THE US CAN PROVIDE THE ARMS, ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE REQUIRED TO WELD AN EFFECTIVE FORCE. WE WOULD HOPE MAXIMUM USE CAN CONTINUE TO BE MADE OF BRITISH AND OTHER ADVISERS, BUT FIRMLY BELIEVE MOST LEADERSHIP IN KUWAIT MUST BE ASSUMED BY ONE GROUP OF FOREIGN ADVISERS AND THAT THESE SHOULD BE US.

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ACTION NEA-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 EUR-08 PM-03 SP-02 NSC-05 NSCE-00

INR-07 CIAE-00 DODE-00 AF-04 ACDA-10 /060 W

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R 110541Z FEB 75

FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2204

INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

USINT BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
KUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2095
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY SANAA
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

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LIMDIS

6. UNLESS KUWAIT WERE INVADED BY IRAQ, WE FIND IT EXTREMELY DOUBTFUL THE GOK WOULD LOOK TO AID FROM A JORDANIAN SPECIAL FORCES BRIGADE. WE FIND IT UNREALISTIC TO SUGGEST THAT KUWAIT HELP FINANCE AND SUPPORT SUCH A GROUP. THE BULK OF KUWAIT'S PALESTINIAN COMMUNITY HOLD JORDANIAN PASSPORTS. THEY ARE ALSO WEST BANK. INTRODUCTION OF A LARGE NUMBER OF EAST BANK JORDANIANS INTO KUWAIT FOR SECURITY OR TRAINING PURPOSES AT THIS TIME WOULD SEEM BOTH UNWISE AND POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS BOTH GOK AND USG INTERESTS.

7. THE INFO CONTAINED IN THIS AND REFTELS SEEMS TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS LEVIED IN REPAIR (B). UNLESS OTHERWISE INSTRUCTED,
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NO ADDITIONAL INFO WILL BE SUPPLIED AT THIS TIME.

8. HOWEVER, THE EMBASSY WOULD LIKE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE REVIEW BEING CONDUCTED IN NEA TO AGAIN MAKE KNOWN ITS CONCERNS REGARDING THE ARMS SALES PROGRAM WE ARE CONDUCTING IN KUWAIT. IF WE ARE WILLING TO MAKE A MAJOR COMMITMENT TO PROVIDE ADVISORS, THE PROGRAM PROBABLY WILL RESULT IN A NET PLUS FOR US INTERESTS. IF NOT, IT COULD BE A DISASTER. OUR GOALS MUST BE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SMALL BUT EFFICIENT DEFENSE FORCE WITHIN A FEW YEARS TIME. THIS WILL REQUIRE GREAT DEAL MORE COMMITMENT THAN IS NOW EVIDENT ON THE PART OF BOTH THE USG AND GOK TO BE SUCCESSFUL.

9. IF WE ARE GOING TO CONTINUE TO STRESS SALES, AT THE SAME TIME WE MUST REMAIN WILLING TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY ADVISERS AND KUWAIT MUST BE WILLING TO ACCEPT THEM AND THE DISCIPLINE AND RISKS INVOLVED. IF WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO PROVIDE THE ADVISERS, WE MUST TELL THE GOK THIS AND RECOMMEND THAT IT SCALE DOWN ITS ARMS MODERNIZATION EFFORT TO A LEVEL MORE CONSISTENT WITH OUR OWN AND ITS ABILITY TO PERFORM. THIS COULD RESULT IN LOST SALES

TO THE US AND A REDUCED CAPABILITY ON THE PART OF KUWAIT
TO DETER IRAQI THREATS, BUT IT WOULD SEEM PREFERABLE TO THE
"UNGUIDED MISSILE" APPROACH ON WHICH WE NOW SEEM EMBARKED.

10. IF WE ARE NOT PREPARED AT THIS TIME TO MAKE THE COMMITMENT
REQUIRED, WE SHOULD SO INFORM THE GOK AND RECOMMEND THAT IT
UNDERTAKE A MORE MEASURED COURSE OF ARMS PURCHASES AND A MORE
GRADUAL MILITARY BUILDUP, WITH LIMITED US AND UK ASSISTANCE AND
IN CONSULTATION WITH ITS ARAB NEIGHBORS, INCLUDING IRAQ. IF THIS
COURSE IS FOLLOWED IT WILL PROVIDE LESS RISK THAT THE GOK WILL
DECIEVE ITSELF RE ITS MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND LESS CHANCE THAT
IRAQ (OR SAUDI ARABIA) WILL REACT ADVERSELY TO KUWAIT'S ARMS
MODERNIZATION PROGRAM.
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